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COMMENTS
DUE PROCESS OF EUTHANASIA: THE LIVING WILL,
A PROPOSAL
Luis KUTNERt
"She asked me to do it," explained Robert Waskin, a young college
student, after he had fatally shot his cancer-striken mother while she lay
in her hospital room. The Grand jury of Cook County, Illinois, dis-
passionately returned an indictment of murder in the first degree.' The
story became headline news, and euthanasia became the subject of
editorial comment on radio and television talk shows.
After a trial of one week, Robert Waskin was freed by a
jury that deliberated only forty minutes before determining that
he was temporarily insane when he shot his mother three times.
The jury further found that he was no longer insane. The
foreman of the jury commented: 'He knew he shot his mother.
That was not disputed, but the prosecution failed to show he
was of sound mind when he did it.' Robert Waskin is quoted
as he prepared to pick up the threads of a nearly shattered life:
'The moral issue of euthanasia. . was not taken up at the trial,
and it should have been faced squarely. Some day it will have to be.'
This case illustrates a dilemma in the criminal law. The underlying
values of our society and the Constitution assert the right to life. The
protection of life is basic to any legal order. Indeed, as Thomas Hobbs
affirmed, the protection of human life is the prime justification for the
existence of a state and the accompanying legal machinery. However,
when one individual observes another who is suffering from the pain of
an incurable disease or a genetic deformation and, motivated by com-
passion, ends his life, the question arises as to whether he should be
regarded as a murderer. One so acting takes the life of another, an act
forbidden by law; but his actions are not motivated by malice or personal
tChairman, World Habeas Corpus Committee, World Peace Through Law Center.
Member of Illinois and Indiana Bars. The research assistance of Ernest Katin, Ph.D.,
is acknowledged.
1. Letter from Patrick A. Truite, State's Attorney's Office, Criminal Division,
Cook County, Illinois. The State also charged that the d'.fendant previously had tried
to administer sleeping pills. Chicago Sun-Times, Aug. 18, 19'7.
2. Chicago Daily News, Jan. 25, 1969.
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profit, rather they are motivated by the very human desire to end suffer-
ing.
Mercy killing raises a myriad of philosophical and theological con-
siderations. However, this paper wil confine itself to a consideration of
the issue from the perspective of law and individual rights. This paper
will first consider the present state of the law, examine proposed solu-
tions, and suggest an approach to the problem.
THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
The common law does not recognize motive as an element of
homicide. If the proved facts establish that the defendant in fact did the kill-
ing wilfully, that is, with intent to kill, and as the result of premedita-
tion and deliberation, there is murder in the first degree regardless of
motive.' Motive is relevant evidence only to establish the degree of
murder or homicide (premeditation).' Conceptually, if the elements of
wilful premeditation exist, the perpetrator of the act stands equally
condemned regardless of the fact that he may have acted from an impulse
of mercy.5
The law in this area, however, cannot be confined to a consideration
of statutory language and appellate court reports. An observation of
what takes place at the trial level indicates that the law in practice deals
differently with mercy killing than does the theory and letter of the law.
"The Law In Action is as malleable as the Law On The Books is
uncompromising." 6 There is a high incidence of failure to indict, ac-
quittals, suspended sentences and reprieves where the killer had mercy as
his motive.7
An illustration of one trial court's approach to mercy killing was
3. P.J.T. CALLAHAN & J. CALLAHAN, THE LAW OF MEDICINE 58-59 (1950) ; State
v. Ehlers, 98 N.J.L. 236, 119 A. 15 (1922) ; Annot., 25 A.L.R. 1007 (1923).
The word 'euthanasia' has a Greek origin and is made up of two component
parts, namely eu and thanatos. The best translation for e& is: easy, happy,
pleasant, painless, while thanatos means death. The meaning of the word is
therefore: an easy, painless death. To relieve the pains that precede death
is the duty of every doctor and may truly be called one of the outstanding
missions of the medical profession. This explains why this particular form of
euthanasia is universally recognized and accepted.
Rud, Euthanasia, J. OF CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, Jan.-Mar.
1953, at 1.
4. Id.
5. For further examples, see State v. Ehlers, 98 N.J.L. 236, 119 A.15 (1922)
People v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920) ; People v. Kirby, 2 Park Crim.
Rep. (N.Y.) 28 (1823) ; and Rex v. Simpson, 84 L.J.R. (n.s) 1893 (K.B. 1915).
6. See Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy Killing"
Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 969 (1958).
7. Id., at 971 nn.11, 12, & 13.
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furnished by People v. Werner,' involving a sixty-nine year old defendant
who suffocated his wife, a hopelessly crippled, bedridden arthritic. In
arraignment proceedings, the state waived the murder charge and per-
mitted the defendant to enter a plea of guilty to a charge of manslaughter.
The court then found the defendant guilty of this charge on his stipulated
admission of the killing. After hearing the testimony of the defendant's
children and pastor concerning his unfailing care and devotion during
the deceased's two-year illness and reading a letter from her doctor
attesting to her excruciating pain and mental despair, the court allowed
the defendant to withdraw his plea and entertained a plea of not guilty
and then found the defendant not guilty because under the circumstances
the jury "would not be inclined to convict." Because there was no reason
to be concerned about recidivism, the court withheld the "stigma" of a
finding and judgment of guilty and allowed the defendant "to go home
. . . and live out the rest of [his] life in as much as [he] can find it
in [his] heart to have."
Despite the statutory provisions to the contrary, the court in this
case based its decision on the defendant's motives. The procedure followed
by the court was criticized as not having been authorized by statute.'
Although the court had the discretion to permit the defendant to withdraw
his plea of guilty, this discretion is limited to those particular instances
where it appears that there is doubt as to the defendant's guilt, or that
he has any defense at all worthy of consideration by a jury, or that the
ends of justice will be served by submitting the case to a jury. ° These
criteria were absent in this case. Nevertheless, in view of the facts, the
court's action accords with what may be regarded as a sense of justice.
That juries, too, often disregard the dictates of the law on this point is
well evidenced by the Waskin1Y case and by cases in other jurisdictions. 2
8. Crim. No. 58-3636, Cook Co. Ct., Ill., Dec. 30, 1958, reported in Williams,
Euthanasia and Abortion, 38 U. COLO. L. REv. 178, 184 & n.15 (1966); and noted in
34 NorE DAME LAw. 460 (1959).
9. 34 NoTRE DAME LAW. 460 (1959).
10. People v. Throop, 359 Ill. 354, 194 N.E. 553 (1935); People v. Kleist, 311
Ill. 179, 142 N.E. 486 (1924).
11. For other examples of cases of juries superimposing their own beliefs upon the
law, see Kamisar, supra note 6, at 1019, 1021 ; and N.Y. Times, May 9, 1939, at 48, col. 1 ;
May 12, 1939, at 1, col. 6; Jan. 23, 1939, at 24; Oct. 2, 1939, at 1, col. 3; Oct. 3, 1938 at
34, col. 3 ; Oct. 19, 1938 at 46, col. 1.
12. The Susanne van de Put case received international attention. This case
involved the trial in Liege, Belgium, of a woman for the murder of her eight day old
daughter, born deformed as a result of the use of thalidomide during pregnancy. The
husband, mother, sister, and family doctor were arraigned as abettors. Popular sympathy
in Belgium and elsewhere was with the defendants, who had acted from what they had
imagined were unselfish motives. At the end of a six day trial, the jury acquitted all
five defendants. The verdict was greeted with exultation throughout the city. N. St.
JOHN-STEvAs, THE RIGHT To LIFE ch. 1 (1964); Oulahan, Euthanasia: Should One
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MERCY KILLING No DIFFERENT FROM OTHER KILLING
Clearly, although conceptually the law does not treat mercy killing
differently from other cases involving the taking of human life, in
practice an exception does exist. Prosecutors, judges and juries do
approach a mercy killing case differently. Public opinion simply does not
reflect the same revulsion against an act of mercy killing that it does
towards other instances of murder. Therefore, society is not prone to
inflict the same type of punishment. Although there may be opposition to
mercy killing in principle, there is sympathy for the mercy killer.
Significantly, in People v. Roberts,13 one of the few cases where a mercy
killer was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprison-
ment, the decision was rendered by a judge without a jury.
Invariably, because of the human interest element involved, a mercy
killing case will receive wide press coverage and focus public attention.
The tendency is for public sympathy to side with the defendant, as was
illustrated in the Suganne van de Put case.1" In the Waskin case the
presiding judge, the defendant's father and his lawyer received letters
urging that mercy be shown." Although objection may be made as to
this treatment of mercy killers, it is necessary to separate what may be
regarded as the "ought" from the "is." The judicial process as it "is,"
deals differently with mercy killers. The defendant may be not prosecuted,
found innocent because of insanity, or found guilty of a lesser offense
then murder and given a light sentence.
THE ABSENCE OF STANDARDS GOVERNING EUTHANASIA
Thus, the law in regard to euthanasia leaves much to be desired. The
absence of at least a semblance of objective determination places a gap
within the legal system. The element of symmetry is lacking.'6 The
accused in a mercy killing case must rely almost entirely on public
sentimentality. Objective criteria are not operating. Conceivably, public
sentiment may be misplaced, and a clever manipulator of public opinion
could kill with evil motive and escape punishment by posing as a mercy
killer. In such a situation, the victim is not assured protection. Moreover,
the present state of the law, as it is evolving from judicial practice, may
in effect be permitting mercy killing without adequate protection for the
victim whose death may be unwarranted and uncanted. Clearly, the lack
Kill a Child in Mercy!, LIFE, Aug. 10, 1962, at 34-35; Gallahan, Tragedy at Liege,
van de Put's Thalidomide Baby, Loox, Mar. 12, 1963, at 72-74.
13. See note 8 supra.
14. See note 12 supra.
15. Chicago Sun-Times, Aug. 18, 1967, at 30.
16. K. LLEWELLYN, THE CoMMAioN LAw TRADITION (1962).
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of definiteness in the present state of the law does not comport with
notions of due process of law.
From another perspective, the current state of the law does not
recognize the right of the victim to die if he so desires. He may be in a
terminal state suffering from an incurable illness and literally forced to
continue a life of pain and despair. Such a denial may well infringe upon
an individual's right of privacy.
SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA AIDING AND ABETTING
Related.to euthanasia is the law on suicide. If an individual wishes
to die and another assists him by providing him with the means for
committing suicide, he may be guilty of murder." In early common
law suicide was regarded as a criminal offense. The punishment for one
who committed suicide was interment in the highway with a stake driven
through the body, and the forfeiture of lands, goods and chattels to the
king. While sanctions against the body and property of the suicide have
been removed, the attempt of a person in England to end his own life de-
liberately is still an attempt to commit a felony, though not an attempt to
commit murder within the Offences against the Person Act of 1861.1
Although the English common law on suicide was never fully accepted in
the United States, in some jurisdictions, such as New York, suicide-
though declared not to be a crime-is censured by statute as a "grave
public wrong."' 9 In at least one American jurisdiction, attempted suicide
is still regarded as a misdemeanor.2"
Today, immunity of suicide actually means immunity of attempted
suicide with the law varying in different jurisdictions as to instigators,
aiders and abettors. In jurisdictions where the distinction between ac-
cessory and principal is abolished, they are treated as principals in
homicide."' Where punishment of accessories is predicated upon the
criminal character of the act of the principal, the instigator, aider and
abettor of suicide enjoy immunity, the act of the principal, not being a
crime, as prevailing in Germany and France. Finally, some statutes
specifically define instigating, aiding and abetting suicide as independent
crimes, sui generis.
17. See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920). The
defendant husband was convicted of murder in the first degree. He had prepared a
poison and had placed it within his wife's reach upon her request while she was confined
to bed with arteriosclerosis.
18. N. ST. JoHNx-STEvAs, supra note 12, ch. 4.
19. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 2301 (McKinney 1944).
20. Silvig, Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal Law, 103 U. PA. L. REv.
350, 371 (1954). The discussion is based on the material presented in this article.
21. N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 2304, 2305 (McKinney 1944).
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Generally, the law in the United States does not permit one to assist
another to commit suicide regarless of motive or if done at the request of
the suicide. Some jurisdictions, however, appear to distinguish situations
where one has instigated or suggested to another that he commit suicide
from where the idea came to the suicide originally.22 The law does not
generally appear to condone suicide. Adaptation is needed to account for
situations where the assistance for the commission of suicide is given to
one who freely requests such help.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Glanville \\iliams, a recognized legal scholar who has long been an
outspoken advocate of euthanasia, has urged that a statute be enacted to
permit "voluntary" mercy killing.24 As originally formulated, his pro-
posal, which is supported by the euthanasia societies in Britain and the
United States, envisions the establishment of a means to immunize
relatives or physicians who would administer a means of ending life upon
a patient who is suffering great pain from an incurable disease for which
there is no cure or relief and which if fatal.
The English Society would require the eligible patient who is over
twenty-one and suffering from a disease involving severe pain to forward
a specially prescribed application-along with two medical certificates.
one signed by the attending physician and the other by a specially
qualified physician-to a specially appointed euthanasia referee who would
satisfy himself by means of a personal interview with the patient and
through other means that the conditions have been met and, if so
satisfied, would issue a euthanasia permit.2"
The American Society would have the eligible patient petition for
euthansia in the presence of two witnesses. The petition would then be filed
with the certificate of an attending physician in a court of appropriate
jurisdiction. The court would then appoint a committee of three, of whom
at least two would be physicians, who would forthwith examine the
patient and such other persons as they deem advisable or as the court
might direct. The committee would then within five days report to the
court as to whether or not the petition should be granted. The American
22. Annot., 13 A.L.R. 1259 (1921).
23. Examples include J. FLETCHER, MORALS AND MEDICINE (1954); Fletcher, The
Patient's Right to Die, HARPER'S, Oct., 1960; Fletcher, Anti-Dysthanasia: The Problem
of Prolonging Death, published by the Euthanasia Society, 1962; Collins, Should We
Let Them Die?, SAT. EVE. POST, May 26, 1962; Anonymous, A New Way of Dying,
THE ATLANTIC, Jan. 1957.
24. G. L. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1957); and
Kamisar, snpra note 6.
25. Kamisar, supra note 6, at 982ff.
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proposal was introduced unsuccessfully as a bill in the legislatures of
Nebraska and New York.
26
However, these proposals cover only "voluntary" euthanasia and do
not cover the many instances of "involuntary" mercy killing, such as the
van de Put case. Moreover, the procedure is too cumbersome and
bureaucratic in that it brings the law into a sick room. Furthermore, the
safeguards are inadequate. There is always the possibility of a mistaken
diagnosis that the patient's condition is incurable.
A difficulty also exists in determining whether the consent of the
patient is in fact freely given. A patient who has been subjected to drugs
is unlikely to be in a rational state. He may well be subject to suggestion
by those around him. Moreover, the study of psychology and psychoanaly-
sis has indicated that all men have a suppressed urge for death, the death
wish or thanos, which may emerge when an inidvidual is seriously ill.
This melancholic impulse may temporarily manifest itself in a desire to
end life and then later ebb. The ending of life is a final and irrevocable act
which cannot be lightly permitted. The inherent risks involved in such a
scheme render the proposal objectionable.
Williams, in urging "voluntary" euthanasia, argues for human free-
dom, the freedom to end one's life. He urges that the law cannot forbid
conduct merely because it is undesirable, but only if the social order is
adversely affected. In American law, the case might be made that to forbid
"voluntary" euthanasia is an infringement of the constitutionally recogn-
ized right of privacy2 7 as derived from either the fourth amendment,
the ninth amendment, or the due process clauses of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. However, the right of privacy may be subordinated
to other supervening legislative ends. In this instance, what is involved
is society's concern for the security and preservation of human life.
Because the authorization of voluntary euthanasia may result in instances
in which individuals might be involuntarily deprived of their life, perhaps
even with malice or for personal benefit, the state may be deemed
justified in forbidding it.
The advocates of "voluntary" euthanasia appear to regard the pro-
motion of their proposal as an entering wedge for the adoption of so-called
mercy killing in other instances as well, such as for the elimination of
the aged, the congenitally defective and others. 8 Williams reveals this
fact when he writes:
26. Id.
27. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Katin, Griswold v. Conn-
ecticut: The Justices and the Uncomnmonly Silly Law, 42 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 680 (1967).
28. Kamisar, supra note 6.
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Much of the literature discussing voluntary euthanasia
has concerned the 'merciful release' of those who are painfully
diseased. Yet this is only part of a wider problem of easing
the passage of all those who are burdened with the ills fre-
quently associated with old age.
We should, in short, try to shake off the neurotic attitude
towards death that has afflicted us for so long, and replace it
with a realistic appreciation of death's biological function. To
quote Dr. Slater . . . 'death plays a wholly favorable, indeed an
essential, part in human economy. Without natural death,
human societies and the human race itself would certainly be
unable to thrive.' Perhaps when we realize this, we may come
to realize at the same time that there is a point in the degenera-
tion of our bodies when life loses its value, and we may then
be prepared voluntarily to leave the scene to our successors.2 9
The experience of Nazi Germany illustrates the danger of the wedge
problem. There euthanasia was expanded from the "voluntary" variety to
the elimination of mentally ill and defective and then used as a rationale
for genocide." Indeed, the Nazi authorities had even contemplated the
elimination of all cardiac cases. To cite the Nazi example is more
than a mere paralogism, for implicit in the rationale behind the advocates
of euthanasia is a subordination of the value of human life. Man is not
considered an end of himself, but as subordinate to the advancement of
other social purposes. When this philosophy becomes predominant, the
nature of the social order is subordinate to radical change.
To meet the problem of dealing with the perpetrator of a mercy
killing, reference has been made to other legal systems."' The German
approach of providing the defense of necessity for preserving the com-
munity is unacceptable, as there should be neither exculpation nor reduc-
tion of sentence where death is administered for the benefit of any person
or persons other than the suffering patient." - In Modern European codes,
motive is considered relevant in classifying an offense. If the motive is the
altruistic desire to comply with the victim's request to be killed, the
homicide turns into the separate crime of "homicide upon request,"
29. Williams, supra note 8.
30. Kamisar, supra note 6; Alexander, Medical Science under Dictatorship, 241
NEw ENGLAND MEDICINE 39 (1949); Ivy, Nazi War Crimes of a Medical Nature,
139 J.A.M.A. 131 (1949); Koessler, Euthanasia in the Hadanzar Sanitarium and
International Law, 43 J. CRI. L. C. & P.S. 735 (1953).
31. Silvig, supra note 20.
32. Id.
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punishable by imprisonment in terms of only a few years. The mercy
killer is then provided with a more lenient treatment under statutory
provisions rather than by resort to more devious means. Moreover, since
special treatment is warranted by statute, there is more assurance of
uniformity in the adjudication of euthanasia cases.
These concepts could be extended to American law to cover euthan-
asia. That the concept of motive is not totally alien to the Anglo-American
legal system is illustrated by the provision in English law for the
offense of infanticide, a modern felony created by statute in 1922 and
modified in 1938. A woman who kills her child under the age of twelve
months while her mind is disturbed from the effects of giving birth is held
to be guilty of manslaughter rather than murder, thereby leaving the
sentence to the discretion of the judge. 33
Another facet of euthanasia involves the situation in which a doctor
acts to prolong the life of a patient. The law recognizes a patient's right
to consent to or to refuse treatment whether it be an injection or an
operation.3" The Illinois Supreme Court has refused to condone the
authorization of blood transfusions to a competent adult who had stead-
fastly asserted her religious beliefs against such a transfusion despite the
fact that she was in extremis.3" The attitude of the law is to recognize
the inviolability of the human body. The patient's consent must be vol-
untary and informed.3" These notions are buttressed by the constitution-
ally recognized right to privacy. Clearly, then, a patient may refuse treat-
ment which would extend his life. Such a decision must rest with the
patient.
However, when a patient is unconscious or is not in a position to
give his consent, the law assumes a constructive consent to such treatment
as will save his lifeY" The physician's authority to proceed with treat-
ment is based upon the presumption that the patient would have con-
sented to treatment necessary to protect his life of health if he had been
able to do so. But the problem arises as to how far such constructive
consent should extend.
A patient may be in a coma suffering from cancer or cerebral hemor-
rhage. The doctor acts to prolong his life by a series of operations and
33. N. ST. JoHN-STEVAs, supra note 12.
34. Morse, Legal Implications of Clinical Investigations, 20 VAND. L. REv. 747,
752 (1967).
35. I re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). A similar decision
was reached by a New York court in Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.YS.2d
705 (Sup. Ct. 1962). A different approach is taken with regard to a minor when the
parent refuses permission for blood transfusion. Note, 41 NorE DAME LAW. 722 (1966).
36. Morse, supra note 34.
37. Id.
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intervenous treatment which continues interminably. The patient may be
paralyzed or completely unresponsive to the world about him. The question
arises as to how far the physician should go to preserve the patient's life.
Catholic theologians have taken the position that the doctor is obliged
to take all ordinary means but not extraordinary means.38 Ordinary
means include those medicines and treatment which can be used without
causing unnecessary pain or expense. The distinction between ordinary
and extraordinary means will vary with time, place, and circumstances.
This position may be related to the legal obligation of exercising due care,
with ordinary means taken to be coincident with exercise of due care.
The standard should be that which is generally practiced.
Under German law a physician's failure to prolong artifically an
expiring painful life by applying stimulants is not regarded as homicide9'
A distinction is made, however, where the victim is not incurably ill.
Although the criminality of inaction by a physician has not been decided
by American courts, as in the German system of jurisprudence where
there is a duty to act, deliberate nonfeasance with intent to cause death is,
generally, punishable homicide." The physician's dilemma is further
complicated where the patient's immediate illness is not incurable but
where a cure will leave him a permanent sufferer. American law apparently
requires that life be prolonged in such situations. But inaction when
motivated by the physician's desire not to prolong the patient's suffering.
is clearly distinguishable from active mercy killing. The argument may be
made that since the physician's duty to act is contractual and predicated
upon the patient's consent, there being no basis in such instances for
presumptive consent, nonfeasance should be unpunished even though
active euthanasia remains punishable. 1
An aspect of this issue came to a head in Britain when it was revealed
that a government supported hospital had followed a practice of denying
the use of a resuscitator to patients who were aged. A clamor of public
protest arose, and the government ordered that such a policy should be
reversed.2 In the United States, such a policy could be regarded as a
denial of equal protection for persons in an arbitrarily designated class.
The aged would be singled out for denial of essential medical treatment.
However, the suspicion lingers that a person of modest means who is
brought to a hospital is given less intensive care than would be the case
with the wealthy. Less concern may be given to the poverty stricken or the
38. N. ST. JOHN-STEVAS, supra note 12, at 52.
39. Silvig, supra note 20.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1967.
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derelict. On the other hand, a patient of considerable mems--or whose
relatives are wealthy-may receive special attention. There is the pos-
sibility that the physicians and the hospital have a vested interest in
keeping the patient alive in order to receive extensive remuneration.
A related problem arises as to at what point should the patient be
assumed to be regarded as dead. The suggested criterion has been the
point where an electroencephalograph indicated that no electrical dis-
charges are being emitted from the brain. Difficult issues arise as to the
lengths to which the physician should go to maintain life in such a
situation and the fact that such decisions must presently be made renders
euthanasia a seemingly less radical proposal.
A SUGGESTED APPROACH AND CONCLUSIONS
This survey indicates that the law effecting euthanasia in practice
differs from its conceptual basis in that, in practice, the judicial process
treats a mercy killer differently from a murderer with malice. The crimi-
nal code is in need of adaptation to account for this situation. The sug-
gested approach is to adopt the standard of motive as indicated by the
codes of other legal systems. The punishment for an accused who killed at
the request of the victim, where the victim was suffering from an incur-
able disease and was in great pain, would be milder than in other incidents
of homicide. A somewhat harsher, but still mild punishment, would be
inflicted upon the accused who killed where the victim did not request to
be killed or was incapable of giving his rational consent, but was suffer-
ing from an apparent physical or mental affliction and there was no
element of malice or personal gain. Such an approach would accord with
notions of due process. It is submitted that to subject the accused to life
imprisonment or execution would constitute excessively cruel and in-
humane punishment in contravention to the eighth amendment of the
Constitution.
Proposals to date to legalize voluntary euthanasia have been rejected
as incapable of providing the necessary safeguards and as being too
cumbersome in application. Moreover, such proposals appear to be an
entering wedge which opens the door to possible mass euthanasia and
genocide.
The law, however, does recognize that a patient has a right to
refuse to be treated, even when he is in extremis, provided he is an
adult and capable of giving consent. Compliance with the patient's wishes
43. N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1967; Miami Herald, Feb. 14, 1967.
44. "The House of Lords defeated a Bill that would have permitted voluntary
euthanasia in Britain. Opponents said the Bill would allow 'suicide by proxy.'" [As-
sociated Press Release, London: Chicago's American, Mar. 26, 1969, at 10, col 8].
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in such circumstances is not the same as voluntary euthanasia. Where,
however, the patient is incapable of giving consent, such as when he is in
a coma, a constructive consent is presumed and the doctor is required
to exercise reasonable care in applying ordinary means to preserve the
patient's life. However, he is not allowed to resort to extraordinary care
especially where the patient is not expected to recover from the comatose
state.
The standard to be applied should reflect the state of the medical art,
the condition of the patient and the wishes of the relatives. To assure that
patients are not arbitrarily deprived of ordinary medical care and to
determine the state where the point has been reached where the patient's
life has been deemed to have ended, a special ombudsmen-type board
should be established to review each case. Every person, regardless of age
or economic circumstance, should be deemed to have a right to life and
to the same intensive type of medical treatment which would accord with
a standard of ordinary care. Extraordinary care would be given if
requested by the relatives. The answer lies in the Rule of Law carefully
processed by a judicial determination based upon the best available
evidence that merciful termination of a human life shall be decreed.
THE LIVING WILL
The law provides that a patient may not be subjected to treatment
without his consent. But when he is in a condition in which his consent
cannot be expressed, the physician must assume that the patient wishes to
be treated to preserve his life. His failure to act fully to keep the patient
alive in a particular instance may lead to liability for negligence. But it
may well be that a patient does not desire to be kept in a state of indefinite
vegetated animation. How then can the individual patient retain the
right of privacy over his body-the right to determine whether he should
be permitted to die, to permit his body to be given to the undertaker?
The law clearly prohibits mercy killing, even if undertaken at the
patient's request. Thus, the patient cannot request another to end his life.
Such an action would subject the actor to prosecution for murder. But an
individual does have the right to refuse to permit a doctor to treat him,
even if such treatment would prolong his live. If a doctor should act
contrary to his wishes, he would be subject to liability.
Where a patient undergoes surgery or other radical treatment, the
surgeon or the hospital will require him to sign a legal statement indicat-
ing his consent to the treatment. The patient, however, while still retaining
his mental faculties and the ability to convey his thoughts, could append
to such a document a clause providing that, if his condition becomes
incurable and his bodily state vegetative with no possibility that he could
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recover his complete faculties, his consent to further treatment would be
terminated. The physician would then be precluded from prescribing
further surgery, radiation, drugs or the running of resuscitating and other
machinery, and the patient would be permitted to die by virtue of the
physician's inaction.
The patient may not have had, however, the opportunity to give his
consent at any point before treatment. He may have become the victim of
a sudden accident or a stroke or coronary. Therefore, the suggested
solution is that the individual, while fully in control of his faculties and
his ability to express himself, indicate to what extent he would consent to
treatment. The document indicating such consent may be referred to
as "a livizg will," "a declaration determining the termination of life,"
"testament permitting death," "declaration for bodily autonomy," "declar-
ation for ending treatment," "body trust," or other similar reference.
The document would provide that if the individual's bodily state
becomes completely vegetative and it is certain that he cannot regain his
mental and physical capacities, medical treatment shall cease. A Jehovah's
Witness whose religious principles are opposed to blood transfusions
could so provide in such a document. A Christian Scientist could, by
virtue of such a document, indicate that he does not wish any medical
treatment.
The document would be notarized and attested to by at least two
witnesses who would affirm that the maker was of sound mind and acted
of his own free will. The individual could carry the document on his person
at all times, while his wife, his personal physician, a lawyer or confidant
would have the original copy.
Each individual case would be referred to a hospital committee, board
or a committee of physicians. A precedent for the functioning of such
committees or boards already exists in many hospitals for determining
whether an abortion is medically necessary. The committee or board
would consider the circumstances under which the document was made
in determinining the patient's intent and also make a determination as to
whether the condition of the patient has indeed reached the point where
he would no longer want any treatment.
The individual could at any time, before reaching the comatose state,
revoke the document. Personal possession of the document would create
a strong presumption that he regards it as still binding. Statements and
actions subsequent to the writing of the document may indicate a contrary
intent. If the physicians find that some doubt exists as to the patient's
intent, they would give treatment pending the resolution of the matter.
The document, if carried on the patient's person, should indicate what
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persons should be contacted if he reaches a comatose state. The physician
would consult with them in making a determination.
A living will could only be made by a person who is capable of giving
his consent to treatment. A person who is a minor, institutionalized, or
adjudged incompetent could not make such a declaration. A guardian
should not be permitted to make such a declaration on behalf of his ward
nor a parent on behalf of his child. If an individual makes a living will
and is subsequently adjudged incompetent, the will would be deemed to
be revoked. However, this revocation would not apply where the state of
incompetency resulted from the medical condition which was contemplated
in making the declaration.
The living will is analogous to a revocable or conditional trust with
the patient's body as the res, the patient as the beneficiary and grantor,
and the doctor and hospital as the trustees. The doctor is given authority
to act as the trustee of the patient's body by virtue of the patient's consent
to treatment. He is obligated to exercise due care and is subject to
liability for negligence. The patient is free at any time to revoke the trust.
From another perspective, the patient in giving consent to treatment is
limiting the authority the doctor and other medical persons may exercise
over his body. The patient has the ultimate right to decide what is to be
done with him and may not irrevocably confer authority on somebody else.
The patient may not be compelled to undergo treatment contrary to his
will. He should not be compelled to take certain drugs, receive innocula-
tions or therapy or undergo surgery without his express assent. At any
point he may stop treatment or he may change physicians.
One problem to be encountered by the living will concept is mental
illness. An individual who becomes mentally ill has the same rights as any
other patient. He may, by the living will, anticipate mental illness and
limit his consent to treatment accordingly. If in the course of his mental
illness he enters an incurable comatose state, treatment may cease. The
problem, however, is that, on becoming mentally ill, the court may find
him incompetent and appoint a guardian.
Could or should the guardian revoke the living will or is it deemed
to have become revoked? Here the approach of the trust concept is
suggested. The trust relationship between the doctor and the patient was
created by the living will with the patient as grantor. It was the patient's
intent, in creating the trust and drawing the trust document-the living
will-to cover contingencies wherein he would be incapable of granting or
withholding assent to treatment. Incompetency because of mental illness
is precisely such a situation. Therefore, the living will remains in effect.
The guardian may not nullify it. However, when the patient is mentally
ill, he may still have instances when his mind is lucid. During such
LIVING WILL
instances he may indicate to his guardian that he wishes the will revoked
and the guardian could then act accordingly. He might also indicate this
intent to the physician who would so inform the guardian and have the
will revoked.
The living will may be used within another context affecting a
mentally ill patient. In agreeing to be committed for treatment to a
hospital, he could condition the kind of treatment to be given to him. By
voluntarily committing himself he does not automatically confer upon the
doctor the right to perform a lobotomy, insulin or electric shock therapy,
to deny him the right to choose another doctor, to deny him the right to
receive visitors or to enjoy other rights. The living will could provide that
he be released from the hospital if he fails to receive any treatment or does
not respond to therapy. If he is confined against his will, the living will
could be used as a basis for invoking a writ of habeas corpus to effectuate
his release.
The living will is limited in its initial creation to adult patients who
are capable of exercising their will. It applies to those patients who have
the right to decide whether they may receive treatment. It does not apply
to a parent acting on behalf of his child. Thus, while an adult patient may
refuse to undergo an operation or receive a blood transfusion which will
save his life, a parent may not deprive a child of such treatment. Though
the state recognizes the rights of parents in relation to their children, it
acts in loco parentis to protect the rights of the children. But the state may
not interfere to infringe upon the rights of a mature individual as to the
disposition of his body; the law is required to protect the autonomy of the
patient.
However, while a patient may determine the type of medical treat-
ment he may receive, he may not use the living will as a means for direct-
ing a doctor or another individual to act affirmatively to terminate his
life. He may not authorize the commission of euthanasia. The Law of
Trusts recognizes that certain types of trusts for certain designated
purposes may be contrary to public policy. Similarly, a living will
authorizing mercy killing is contrary to public policy. In this instance,
public policy considerations outweigh the apparent rights of the patient.
The basic function of the law is to protect human life. Because of the
possibility that, if mercy killing be permitted without judicial controls, an
individual would be killed contrary to his will and the law now extant
cannot permit legalized euthanasia. The right to life is basic and the
possibility of some persons being murdered regardless of their will
means that euthanasia may not be condoned. Therefore, as of now, a
doctor cannot be directed to act affirmatively to terminate a patient's life.
He may, however, be directed and exculpated to act passively by inaction.
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However, the patient's living will adjudicated by a court and buttressed
by medical and lay testimony and evidence, can create the affirmative in-
action termination of a patient's life. This can be resorted to in instances
where the hospital board on euthanasia may decline to assume the
responsibility.
